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Abstract
This paper investigates the long-run influence of the Neolithic Revolution on con-
temporary cultural norms and institutions as reflected in the dimension of collectivism-
individualism. We outline an agricultural origins-model of cultural divergence where
we claim that the advent of farming in a core region was characterized by collectivist
values and eventually triggered the out-migration of individualistic farmers towards
more and more peripheral areas. This migration pattern caused the initial cultural
divergence, which remained persistent over generations. The key mechanism is demon-
strated in an extended Malthusian growth model that explicitly models cultural dy-
namics and a migration choice for individualistic farmers. Using detailed data on the
date of adoption of Neolithic agriculture among Western regions and countries, the
empirical findings show that the regions which adopted agriculture early also value
obedience more and feel less in control of their lives. They have also had very little
experience of democracy during the last century. The findings add to the literature
by suggesting the possibility of extremely long lasting norms and beliefs influencing
today’s socioeconomic outcomes.
Keywords: Neolithic agriculture, comparative development, Western reversal
JEL Codes: N50, O43
1 Introduction
It is widely accepted that culture has strongly influenced patterns of economic develop-
ment in countries around the world. More specifically, several studies have shown that
the prevalence of individualistic norms, characterized by a strong belief in one’s own abil-
ity and a preference for democratic governance, are positively associated with economic
growth and lower risks of violence and war. Collectivist norms, characterized by in-group
orientation and a high acceptance of traditional authority, have been shown to be less
conducive to long-run economic development.1
∗We would like to thank Romain Wacziarg, Saumitra Jha, Avner Greif, Jacob Shapiro, Carles Boix,
Ernesto Dal Bo, Ran Abramitzky, James Fearon, Jonathan Bendor, Ian Hodder, Guido Tabellini, partici-
pants of ISNIE 2009 conference and the Haas School of Business Institutional Analysis Seminar participants
for their comments and guidance. All errors are our own.
†Email: ola.olsson@economics.gu.se
‡Email: christopher.paik@nyu.edu
1See for instance the extensive recent empirical work of Thornhill and Fincher (2013), as well as
Tabellini (2010), Gorodnichenko and Roland (2010, 2011), and Ashraf and Galor (2011b) within economics.
Alesina and Giuliano (2014) provide an extensive overview of the literature.
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But why are some cultures primarily individualistic and others collectivistic? Two
main hypotheses have recently been advanced in the literature to explain this pattern.
First, a number of studies have concluded that the nature of social norms is linked to
the specific conditions of agricultural production. In particular, it has been argued that
farming based on irrigation easily gives rise to centrally coordinated production structures
which, in turn, leads to collectivist cultural norms. Rain-fed agriculture, according to this
view, requires less central coordination and is therefore associated with individualistic
norms.2
Second, Fincher et al (2008) and Thornhill et al (2009) have advanced the so called
pathogen prevalence-theory, arguing that people in regions that historically were more
intensively exposed to infectious diseases tended to develop collectivist norms with an in-
group, conservative bias against strangers and influences from outside. Over the centuries,
a more lethal disease environment gave rise to selective pressures that favored collectivist
ideals.3
In this paper, we argue that adverse collectivist cultural norms and institutions in the
Western hemisphere have roots that can go even further back in time to the Neolithic
revolution more than 10,000 years ago. We propose that both the nature of produc-
tion and the prevalence of pathogens are primarily consequences of the transition from
a hunter-gatherer survival strategy to a sedentary agricultural mode of production with
a much higher population density. In addition to these two factors, the constant threat
of predatory attacks from more primitive neighbors was yet another factor that favored
collectivist cultural norms and suppression of individualistic expressions. We demonstrate
that collectivist cultural norms and autocratic political institutions in Western regions
and countries have a positive relationship with the time elapsed since the first transition
to agriculture. People in regions that made a late transition to Neolithic agriculture in-
stead value individualism, have a sense of control of their lives, and tend to live in stable
democracies.
Our paper outlines an agricultural origins-model of cultural divergence where we argue
for a persistent link between the agricultural transition and current culture/institutions.
The model is set in the Malthusian modelling framework of Ashraf and Galor (2011b)
with vertically transmitted cultural norms from parents to children. Internal and external
influences might shift preferences to some degree towards more or less individualistic or
collectivistic preferences. We propose that the original agricultural societies were typically
strongly collectivist and autocratic. As discussed above, there were three main reason for
this pattern: The collectivist nature of production, the prevalence of pathogens, and the
2The argument that irrigation was closely linked to hierarchical, ”despotic” governments among the
early riverine civilizations comes originally from Wittfogel (1957). Jones (1981) discuss the social impli-
cations of rain-fed agriculture. Benzen et al’s (2013) empirical analysis demonstrates that irrigation is
associated with less democracy and more stratified societies. In a recent article, Talhelm et al (2014) show
that people in labor-intensive rice-growing regions within China are more prone to collectivist norms that
people from rain-fed, wheat-growing regions.
3Gorodnichenko and Roland (2010) use genetic proximity to people in the United States as an instru-
ment for individualist attitudes but do not explain why they are strong in America.
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threat of predation by neighboring primitive peoples.
Our analysis starts in an agricultural core region comprising both obedient collectivists
as well as individualists where parents have paternalistic preferences for their offspring to
share their own cultural values. The model describes how the strong collectivist cultural
influences might eventually induce the individualists to consider leaving the core. Faced
with the threat of steadily shrinking as a proportion of the population, the individualists
prefer to migrate and colonize new lands despite the substantial direct costs and lower
agricultural productivity that this is associated with. In the new land, there will be
new tendencies towards collectivism as the pressures from production, pathogens and
predation gradually increase in strength. Over time, the most determined individualists
will self-select into once again colonizing new lands. In this manner, successive waves of
migrating farmers move further and further away from the old agricultural core region and,
in the process, become more and more individualistic-oriented in their values. Cultural
and institutional differences with roots in the Neolithic have in this way persisted to the
present day.
In support of the arguments above, this paper provides some empirical evidence for the
persistence of the Neolithic impact on the current cultural and institutional differences. In
our empirical analysis, we use data on 765 archaeological sites from Pinhasi et al. (2005)
to create an approximate date of transition to agriculture for 64 countries, as well as 492
regions in 43 countries throughout the Western area.4 Collectivist attitudes are captured
by questions from the World Value Survey regarding people’s views on the importance
of obedience and of having a sense of control of one’s life. People who value obedience
in child-raising and who do not feel to be in control of their own lives, are regarded as
collectivists whereas people who value individual independence and who feel they have
control of their own lives, are referred to as individualists. As a broad indicator of formal
institutions that embody individualistic cultural values, we also use a variable capturing
the cumulative experience of democracy during 1900-2000 from Gerring et al (2005).
The main results corroborate what evolutionary psychology and economic studies have
suggested with regard to culture and economic performance: The possibility of extremely
long-lasting norms and beliefs that continue to influence today’s society. The empirical re-
sults show that regions which adopted agriculture early also value the virtues of obedience
in general and have a weaker sense of being in control of their lives. These cultural views
are also reflected in countries’ formal institutions: Regions that made an early transition
to agriculture have been far less democratic during the last century than countries that
made a late transition. The results are robust to controlling for numerous historical and
contemporaneous variables.
Our paper is related to many different strands of literature. Most obviously, our re-
search is closely associated with Olsson and Paik (2013) and Lagerlo¨f (2013). The current
paper provides a theoretical and empirical explanation to the reduced form negative re-
4Apart from in Olsson and Paik (2013), the data from Pinhasi et al has also been used by Ashraf and
Michalopoulos (2011) and Hansen et al (2013).
3
lationship between current GDP levels and the time since the Neolithic, which is the key
feature in the papers above. Gorodnichenko and Roland (2013) present a model describing
why societies with individualistic norms are more likely to adopt and maintain democratic
governance. Bentzen et al. (2013) as well as Litina (2013) both focus on the need for irri-
gation in the old agricultural core regions but reach different conclusions. Unlike Benzen
et al, Litina (2013) sees irrigation as the foundation for cooperation and trust. In general,
the central importance of the Neolithic transition for understanding current levels of de-
velopment has previously been emphasized by Diamond (1997), Olsson and Hibbs (2005),
Putterman (2008) and others.5
The cultural and institutional development of Europe is a recurring theme in many
influential works.6 Like Tabellini (2010), our study is focusing on long-run cultural diver-
gence in a Western setting and two of our key outcome variables from the World Value
Survey (control and obedience) are the same as in Tabellini’s study. However, the long-run
driver of cultural divergence in our paper is the differential timing of Neolithic agriculture
rather than more recent historical levels of education and political institutions. Further-
more, our sample of European regions is more extensive than in Tabellini’s work (492 vs
67).
The theoretical model of our paper uses the Malthusian growth framework devel-
oped by Ashraf and Galor (2011a). Our setup also includes the extension in Ashraf and
Galor (2011b) that incorporates the Bisin and Verdier (2001) type of vertical cultural
transmission dynamics.7 We extend this existing framework by including a decision by
individualistic farmers whether to remain in the collectivist core or whether to colonize
and introduce agriculture in a new land.8 Our model predicts that individualists will leave
the core when the forces towards conformity and collectivism have reduced the proportion
of individualists to a critical level beyond which they are better off as colonizers in a new
land despite the significant costs and losses in terms of agricultural productivity that such
5For an overview of many of the most recent works on long-run development, see Spolaore and Wazciarg
(2013).
6Classic works include North and Thomas (1973), Jones (1981), North (1990), Pomeranz (2000), Greif
(2006) and Morris (2010). Blaydes and Chaney (2013) recently study the institutional impact of the
emergence of feudal institutions during the 9th century. Building upon the work of Ashraf and Galor
(2013), Becker et al. (2014) show that the heterogeneity in risk preferences within a country is positively
associated with the level of genetic diversity, which in turn depends on the timing of the original settlement
since the migration out of Africa. See also Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) for an overview of many of their
recent articles on institutions and culture. Alesina and Giuliano (2014) reviews the most recent articles
on the links between culture and institutions.
7In their empirical section, Ashraf and Galor (2011b) demonstrate that geographical isolation during
pre-industrial times was associated with a relatively low cultural diversity and levels of prosperity today,
whereas isolation was actually beneficial for economic development during the agricultural stage. The
explanation to this pattern is that production in the agricultural era did not benefit much from diversity
and individualism whereas industrial production did.
8The migration choice is somewhat related to the decision whether to form a new ethnic group or remain
in the existing group, like in Ahlerup and Olsson (2012). The model in this paper is clearly distinguished
from Ahlerup and Olsson (2012) since we model a migration decision among farmers rather than an ethnic
fission in a hunter-gatherer population. The driver of cultural differences in the current model is the
interplay between collectivist and individualistic norms whereas cultural differences in Ahlerup and Olsson
(2012) are caused by a geographically induced ”cultural drift” that limits effective communication between
groups.
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a move implies.
We believe that the key contribution of our paper is the modelling of how agriculture
spread through migration across the Western area by more and more individualistic farm-
ers. We think that our model is potentially more broadly relevant for understanding also
other historical migration episodes. For instance, it is well known that the settlement of
America from 1500 CE onwards was often carried out by groups that were not well inte-
grated in their home countries and even refused to conform to the prevailing political or
religious hegemony at the time.9 Although data for earlier periods are scarce, we believe
our model might also serve as a point of reference for understanding important migration
movements such as the Greek colonization of the Western Mediterranean in antiquity, the
Austronesian settlement of islands in the Pacific Ocean, and the Viking expansion to the
British Isles and into current Russia from about 800 CE.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the series of arguments
explaining in detail the long term cultural divergence theory, and Section 3 presents the
model. For empirical support, Section 4 presents the data, Section 5 discusses the empirical
strategy, and Section 6 presents the findings. Section 7 concludes with suggestions for
relevant future research.
2 Agricultural Origins and Cultural Divergence
In this section, we outline an agricultural origins-theory explaining why areas that made
a late transition to agriculture would come to be endowed with cultural norms and insti-
tutions that were relatively individualistic and non-conformist in nature. The theory also
explains why countries and regions close to the origin of agriculture still today exhibit
collectivist cultural norms and autocratic institutions.
The argument rests on three building blocks: 1) The original agricultural societies were
strongly collectivist and autocratic. 2) Agriculture mainly spread throughout the Western
lands through migration of individualistic farmers. 3) Cultural norms with roots in the
Neolithic Revolution have persisted to the present day. We discuss each of these building
blocks in turn below.
2.1 Origin of Collectivist Agricultural Societies
The earliest evidence of domesticated plants and animals date back to about 8500 BCE in
the Fertile Crescent, encompassing parts of modern Israel, Jordan, Turkey, Syria, Iraq and
Iran. The wild progenitors of grasses such as wheat and barley were domesticated first
and somewhat later goats, pigs, horses and cattle. The new technology spread rapidly to
other parts of the region. It was soon associated with a very sharp increase in population
growth and a radical change in terms of social organization. Already by 8,000 BCE, it
9See for instance Abramitzky et al (2012) for a study of Norwegian migrants during the mass migration
era 1850-1913. Their results indicate a negative selection into migration from urban areas in terms of
individual income.
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is estimated that an agricultural village like Abu Hureyra in current Syria hosted about
5,000 individuals (Bellwood, 2005).
In our view, there are three primary factors explaining why the original agricultural
societies in the Fertile Crescent were highly collectivist: i) The nature of production, (ii)
the prevalence of pathogens, and (iii) the imminent threat of predation.
The most obvious change that the Neolithic Revolution brought was perhaps the na-
ture of production. From having been nomadic hunter-gatherers, the first farmers were
sedentary and lived in permanent village dwellings. Whereas hunter-gatherers were rela-
tively egalitarian, lacking private property rights, the new agricultural mode of production
encouraged the accumulation of wealth and a delineation of what property belonged to
whom. A strong worship of ancestors, manifested in the practice of plastered skulls that
were kept inside houses, indicate a strong awareness of kinship ties and perhaps also of
inheritance within the family (Morris, 2010).
The early agricultural communities were hierarchical societies, led by powerful chiefs
who over the centuries gradually transformed into divine kings. Some of the surplus
from food production was amassed in public storage facilities. The king and his elite
in control of such wealth could easily redistribute it to warriors under their command,
acquire luxury goods, and construct impressive public monuments such as temples and
palaces that further enhanced their prestige. Specialized workforces including craftsmen,
warriors, priests, laborers, and nobilities emerged, all acting within a distinct hierarchy
placing importance on order and loyalty. The rise of a non-working class and the need to
feed these non-farmers with surplus produce, strongly contributed to the rise of extractive
political systems with hierarchical orders (Wittfogel, 1957; Diamond, 2005).
As demonstrated further below, a first wave of migration out of the Fertile Crescent
happened in the centuries after 7000 BCE. The addition of domesticated animals to the
standard set of species at this time further increased the mobility of farmers who were
unhappy with social developments in the core. The arid lands surrounding the rivers Eu-
phrates and Tigris were settled by 6000 BCE (Bellwood, 2005). Agriculture in these areas
were only possible through river irrigation and turned out to be even more demanding
in terms of central coordination (Postgate, 1995). The riverbanks of the Nile in Egypt
were settled about the same time, using similar irrigation practices of dykes, canals, and
flood gates. Without centralized coordination, water management in these otherwise in-
hospitable areas could easily collapse and lead to disaster.
In his famous ”hydraulic hypothesis”, Wittfogel (1957) identified river irrigation to
be the key factor behind the rise of strongly centralized and autocratic states. By this
time, the emerging civilizations were further circumscribed by deserts and by neighboring
areas that were already filled up by farming populations. People had nowhere to escape
from the ”beehive” communities in Mesopotamia and Egypt. This also contributed to the
gradual centralization of power towards ”proto-states” (Carneiro, 1970).
A second important factor behind the rise of collectivism in the early farming commu-
nities was the pests and plagues that came with agriculture. According to the ”parasite
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model of democracy”, developed by Fincher et al (2008) and Thornhill et al (2009), com-
munities in places where the risk of infectious disease is significant tend to be characterized
by typical collectivist features such as in-group cooperation, a low willingness to interact
with strangers, conservative traditions, and authoritative leadership. Individual initiative
is discouraged whereas obedience is rewarded. According to the theory, these collectivist
norms are fundamentally a behavioral (and perhaps genetically transmitted) adaptation
serving to minimize the risk of contagious disease. Analogously, in environments with
a lower prevalence of pathogens, selection pressures are more in favor of individualistic
behavior characterized by out-group cooperation, openness to new ideas and trade, and
stronger individual freedom and rights.
Although the pioneering literature on pathogen prevalence and collectivism/individualism
does not explicitly address the role of the Neolithic Revolution, a lot of evidence indeed
suggests that early farming was strongly associated with the introduction of lethal crowd
diseases. Diamond (1997) documents how several of the great pests such as smallpox,
measles and influenza started to spread among humans in the densely populated, unhy-
gienic farming villages where man and animals often shared quarters. Later killers such
as the Bubonic Plague were spread by rats that naturally flourished in farming villages
and large settlements. Infectious diseases like these could not be sustained among iso-
lated hunter-gatherer societies and indeed only emerged after the transition to Neolithic
agriculture.10
A third reason for collectivism in the agricultural core area was the imminent threat of
predation by neighboring peoples. The accumulation of harvests, domesticated animals,
tools, pottery, women, and luxury goods in cities with temples and towers must have filled
the neighboring nomadic peoples with awe and an irresistible temptation for looting or even
conquest. The history of Mesopotamia, Syria and other regions in the Fertile Crescent are
indeed full of episodes of attacks from foreign peoples, ranging from Amorites, Kassites and
Arabs to Mongols. Societies that did not possess a strong military defense were unlikely to
last for long. Applying the same logic as in the ”parasite model” above, we argue that this
constant threat of invasion contributed to further cement the various facets of collectivism
and inhibit the emergence of individualism.
2.2 Migration and Cultural Divergence
Population pressure within the first farming communities soon induced people to colonize
and settle in new lands. This migration meant that diffusion of agriculture happened
mainly through physical movement of farmers from the origin of agriculture to other parts
of the world (Bellwood, 2005; Cavalli-Sforza et al, 1994). The assumption of agriculture
inducing population pressure and migration of people to new settlements, is drawn from
10When we run a regression with a measure of historical pathogen prevalence from Fincher et al (2008)
as the dependent variable and time since the Neolithic transition as an explanatory variable for 44 countries
with available data, we find a very strong and significant positive correlation, suggesting that the agricul-
tural transition contributed importantly to the subsequent disease environment in countries. Results are
available upon request.
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the widely accepted demic diffusion theory by Ammerman and Cavalli-Sforza (1984). The
”demic diffusion” refers to a diffusionary process by population growth and physical move-
ment of farmers.11 The Neolithic migrants conquered new lands and in the process often
replaced aboriginal hunter-gatherers.
Some of the farmers who migrated out from the agricultural core in the Fertile Crescent
shifted the agricultural frontier westward through across the Bosporus and into Europe.
The farmers brought the package of domesticated plants and animals that they had devel-
oped in the Fertile Crescent. According to Bellwood (2005) and other sources, the advance
of farming in the northerly direction came to a halt at the Hungarian plain from which
agriculture did not spread for perhaps 600 years. The reasons for this delay are disputed
but probably include both cultural and environmental explanations.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the Average time since transition to agriculture
among the 492 regions in our sample. The figure indicates a relatively steady rate of
dispersion up until about 5500 BCE when there was an unusually rapid spread into many
regions, marked by the sudden peak in the distribution. The migrants followed the Danube
onto the loess soils of the Rhineland and west towards the Paris basin. The new coloniza-
tion was carried out by farmers with a different culture from before referred to as Linear
Bandkeramik (LBK). The characteristics of this culture included settlements in longhouses
along rivers, incised pottery and a package of plants and animals adapted to a temperate
climate (Bellwood, 2005). In a few hundred years, this culture had settled a very large
part of northwestern Europe in one big movement.
Insert Figure 1
However, in the coastlands of northern Germany and Poland, the Netherlands, Bel-
gium and Denmark, farmers met strong resistance by non-farming communities living off
the abundant aquatic resources in the area. Once again, there was a standstill in the agri-
cultural expansion, as indicated by the fall in the distribution of newly settled regions in
figure 2. When the farming lifestyle eventually continued spreading northward, reaching
the Baltic Sea by 4500 BCE, the British isles by 4000 BCE and Sweden by 3500 BCE, the
farmers mingled to a much greater extent with thriving existing hunter-gatherer cultures
than in continental Europe.
Several key findings suggest that the culture of the colonizers gradually changed as the
frontier moved northwestwards. Nothing similar to the cities or temples of Mesopotamia
were found among the first farmers in the northwestern parts. With the sudden advance
of the LBK-culture around 5500 BCE, there are instead strong indications of a relatively
11Support for the demic diffusion theory come from Bellwood (2005)’s work on the spread of ethnolin-
guistic groups, Cavalli-Sforza (1994)’s work on genetic spread and Bentley’s work on looking at strontium
isotope analysis of early Neolithic skeletons. For further evidence supporting the demic diffusion argument
refer to Cavalli-Sforza et al (1994), Sokal (1991) and Pinhasi (2005). In genetics the demic diffusion is
marked by clines of genetic spread moving northwest from the Middle East. Studies supporting the demic
diffusion argument include Chikhi (2002), who finds an average contribution of between 50-65 percent by
Near Eastern farmers to the European gene pool.
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egalitarian social structure where people lived together in timbered longhouses without
clear social stratification. In the words of Bellwood (2005):
The longhouses...might have reflected non-lineage societies in which early
landownership patterns were fluid - a pattern in which people could move fre-
quently from one village or longhouse to another...Such a society can be charac-
terized as oriented towards the acquisition of labor rather than land...Longhouses
thus correlate from this perspective with a society in pioneer mode, where in-
dividual families need mobility. (Bellwood, 2005, p 77)
As farming spread even further northwards, the indications of a blending of farming
and native hunter-gatherer populations explain why the tendencies towards an egalitarian
social structure become even stronger. Among the populations of northern Europe, it
appears to have been common even for farmers to leave their agricultural lifestyle during
periods and instead subsist on hunted game. Such a shift would of course have been
unthinkable in the overcrowded farming communities in the Fertile Crescent where land
was generally more fertile.
Our interpretation of this evidence is that it is consistent with a model whereby it is
mainly the individuals who are least integrated within their old community and who are
most averse to collectivism, who decide to leave and colonize new lands even if the original
lands are more fertile. As population grows over time within this new community, it will
once again be the least integrated individuals who are most averse to the collectivist ten-
dencies of the leadership who decide to move and shift the frontier further. In this way, the
colonization of new lands and the implied introduction of Neolithic agriculture, are carried
out by individuals who by a self-selection process become more and more individualistic
in their values. Such a pattern is conducive to the historical cultural evidence showing
less socially stratified farming communities among the northwestern regions that adopted
agriculture thousands of years later than in the agricultural core regions.
2.3 Long-Run Persistence of Culture and Institutions
The long term persistence argument regarding culture and institutions rests on the as-
sumption that once established, culture is much less capable of dramatic shifts as it is
already entrenched (Posner, 1980). It follows directly from the works of North (1990),
Tabellini (2010), Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) and others who argue that it takes long
time to embed new routines, customs, traditions and conventions into an existing institu-
tion, even when formal rules change under external influence. Once a development path
is set on a particular course, it is endogenous to the past and only marginal changes will
be made by the players seeking immediate solutions to their problems; the result is often
the persistence of inefficient government and culture detrimental to a civil society (North,
1990, Putnam, 1993).
This line of argument is also similar to the hypotheses testing the long term effects
of historical institutions, technology and economic performance on current socioeconomic
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outcomes (Diamond, 1997; Comin et al, 2010; Putterman, 2008) or the even older impact
of the original ”Out-of-Africa”-migration on current levels of ethnic diversity (Ahlerup and
Olsson, 2012) and levels of prosperity (Ashraf and Galor, 2013). Culture - like technology,
institutions, and genetic markers - is resilient in nature and tend to be inherited from one
generation to other.
3 The model
In this section, we outline an extended version of the Malthusian growth model of Ashraf
and Galor (2011b) where cultural transmission follows a similar dynamics as in Bisin
and Verdier (2001) and Boyd and Richerson (1985). Our contribution to the model lies in
modelling a migration choice for people with individualistic norms in a farming population
during the Malthusian era. Although the model is primarily intended to explain the
gradual colonization of Europe by farmers from a collectivist core area, the theory might
apply also to other historical population expansions such as the Bantu expansion in Africa,
the ancient Greeks in the Mediterranean or the Austronesian colonization of islands in the
Pacific Ocean.
The initial setting for the model is a continent where agriculture has recently emerged
in a core region whereas all other regions are still populated by hunter-gatherers.
3.1 The Malthusian model
3.1.1 Individuals
Let us imagine an overlapping-generations framework with a representative individual in
the agricultural core region. The individual lives for two periods, childhood and adulthood.
All key choices are made in adulthood. The individual has a utility function given by
ut = c
γ
t · (Ptnt)1−γ (1)
where ct is the individual’s level of consumption at time t with an associated preference
parameter γ, nt is the (continuous) number of children of each adult person and Pt is
the probability that the grown-up children who are born at time t share the same basic
cultural norms as the parent when they have become adults at time t + 1. One unit of
time might thus be thought of as a generation.
People can be of two distinct cultural types; collectivist or individualist. Collectivist
types are loyal and obedient to authorities in society including parents and kings and
easily conform to the prevailing norms in society. They stay away from strangers and are
prone to adopt an ethnocentric view of the world. Individualistic cultural types refuse
to conform to the norms of the collectivists and want to do things their own way. They
are open to out-group cooperation, have a more egalitarian social structure, and do not
necessarily follow traditional leaders.
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An important assumption in the utility function is that parents have paternalistic
preferences in the sense that they have a strong preference for their children to be of the
same cultural type as themselves. For simplicity, a parent is assumed to get zero utility
in the event that her children adopt a different cultural norm from that of herself (which
happens with a probability 1− Pt). The dynamics of this cultural transformation will be
explained further below.
The adult individual earns a wage income wt which can be used for either child rearing
or consumption.12 The budget constraint is therefore
ct + τnt ≤ wt
where τ is the cost of rearing one child. Combining (1) and the budget constraint gives
us an optimization problem for the choice of nt :
n∗t = arg max
[
(wt − τnt)γ · (Ptnt)1−γ
]
.
From the first-order conditions, it is straightforward to show that the utility maximiz-
ing quantity of children is
n∗t =
(1− γ)wt
τ
. (2)
Since the adult population in the next generation is Lt+1 = n
∗
tLt, we can express the
law of motion for labor as:
Lt+1 = n
∗
tLt =
(1− γ)wtLt
τ
(3)
3.1.2 Production
The aggregate production function for agriculture during the Malthusian era is given by
Yt = (AX)
1−α · Lαt .
In this function, Yt is output, X is the amount of land and A is its general productivity,
Lt is the size of the labor force (equal to the number of live adults in period t), and
α ∈ (0, 1) is the output elasticity of labor. For simplicity, we follow the convention of
normalizing the amount of land to X = 1. There are no property rights to land so holders
of land receive no compensation.
The market for labor is competitive and workers are paid their average product, which
will also be equal to the equilibrium income per person:
w∗t =
(
A
Lt
)1−α
=
Yt
Lt
= y∗t . (4)
12Wages should not be thought of as modern wages at the end of the month but rather as in-kind
returns for work effort.
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Wages thus increase with land productivity and decrease with the size of the working
population at time t.
3.1.3 The evolution of cultural norms
The key part of the model concerns the evolution of cultural norms. Let us assume that
there is a fraction of ωt individualists in the population Lt whereas a fraction 1 − ωt are
collectivists. The collectivists are in majority at time t since their willingness to obey a
central coordinating leadership is one of the key reasons why they have been able to create
an early cohesive agricultural society in the first place. Hence, our starting point is that
ωt < 1/2.
However, children to both collectivist and individualistic parents are potentially subject
to cultural influences from the adults in the rest of the society.13 An initially individualistic
child is converted into a collectivist adult with a probability of σ > 0. σ might manifest
itself in the form of religious propaganda or patriotic indoctrination from the elite. In the
early agricultural states, such an in-group, conformist cultural influence was often intense.
However, also collectivists are subject to a competing, out-group cultural influence.
The probability that a collectivist child becomes an individualistic adult is given by µ > 0.
Such a cultural influence is the result of cultural diffusion from more egalitarian hunter-
gatherer neighboring societies. For the founding agricultural core regions, this influence
was most likely weak. We assume initially that σ > µ and that the combined cultural
impacts are σ + µ < 1.
The cultural influences described above imply that the share of the population that is
individualistic in period t+ 1, given a level ωt > 0 in period t, is
ωt+1 = ωt (1− σ) + (1− ωt)µ = P It (ωt, σ, µ) . (5)
The proportional share of the individualistic population ωt+1 is equal to the probability
at t that any child turns out to be individualistic at t+ 1; P It (ωt, σ, µ).
Comparative statics on the basis of (5) reveals that
∂P It
∂ωt
= 1− σ − µ > 0
∂P It
∂σ
= −ωt < 0; ∂P
I
t
∂µ
= (1− ωt) > 0
In other words, the probability that any grown-up child will be an individualist in
adulthood will thus increase with the fraction in the population that are already individ-
ualist ωt and with the strength of outside influences µ, whereas the probability decreases
with the strength of cultural assimilation σ.
13One might have modelled the cultural influence on children as having first a parental influence stage,
then an influence from society at large (see for instance the appendix in Ashraf and Galor, 2011b). Since
the qualitative insights would have been the same, we refrain from including such a parental stage.
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The equivalent probability that any child will be a collectivist in adulthood is
1− ωt+1 = ωtσ + (1− ωt) (1− µ) = PCt (ωt, σ, µ) . (6)
Given the structure of the parameters, it will be the case that P It < P
C
t at all t.
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3.1.4 Steady states
Based on the results above, the indirect utility of an individual of type i ∈ {I, C} at some
time t can be expressed as
vit = (wt − τn∗t )γ ·
(
P itn
∗
t
)1−γ
= (γw∗t )
γ ·
(
P it (1− γ)w∗t
τ
)1−γ
=
= γγ
(
A
Lt
)1−α( τ
1− γ
)γ−1 (
P it
)1−γ
(7)
Over time, a gradual increase in the level of the population Lt will push wages and income
per capita levels down due to diminishing returns to labor and result in a lower welfare.
This process will continue until the economy has converged to a steady state.
Note also that the fact that P It < P
C
t implies that v
I
t < v
C
t at all t, i.e. individualists
are always worse off in the core than the collectivists.
In this Malthusian economy, the size of the population will reach a steady state when
Lt+1 = Lt = L¯ so that n¯ = 1. Combining (3) and (4), we can deduce that the steady state
level of population in the core is
L¯ = A ·
(
1− γ
τ
) 1
1−α
. (8)
Total population thus increases with the productivity of land A and decreases with the
cost of raising children τ . Inserting this level into (4), we find that the associated steady
state wage level (equal to the steady state income per person) is
w¯ =
τ
1− γ = y¯.
This expression shows a fundamental insight from Malthusian models that long-term
income per capita is unaffected by land productivity A. A better land quality instead
results in a higher population, which eventually pushes per capita incomes down to y¯.
In a similar way, the steady state proportions of individualists and collectivists in the
population can be found to be
ω¯ =
µ
σ + µ
= P¯ I ; 1− ω¯ = σ
σ + µ
= P¯C . (9)
14Comparing the two probabilities shows that P It − PCt = 2 (µ+ ωt (1− σ − µ)− 0.5) < 0. A formal
demonstration that this inequality always holds at the assumed parameter values is available upon request.
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ω¯ increases with the strength of outside forces µ and decreases with internal cultural
influence σ. The reverse is true for the conformist share of the population. It is also easily
verified that P¯ I < P¯C .
3.2 The colonization decision
So far, the exposition has been a compact version of the Malthusian model of Ashraf and
Galor (2011b). We will now introduce a new aspect not covered by the initial model; a
decision for farmers in the core about whether to remain at home or move to a new frontier
territory and found an agricultural colony. This colonization of the frontier by farmers
from the core thus constitutes the time for the frontier region’s transition to agriculture.
We assume that in each time period, individuals first consider the choice of staying or
leaving and then produce and consume according the standard optimization described
above. We will thus have a repeated two-stage process in which individuals take the
second stage decisions into account already in the initial migration stage.
In making the first-stage decision, individuals consider three factors; (i) the indirect
utility of remaining in the core, (ii) the indirect utility of living and farming in a new
area, and (iii) the fixed costs associated with the break-up and colonization of a land
inhabited by hunter-gatherers. Since we know from above that individualists in the core
always have a lower indirect utility than the collectivists, it is sufficient to focus only on
the individualists’ choice of whether to stay in their region of origin or to emigrate and
colonize some other region. We will assume that the agricultural economy has reached its
steady state levels of population L¯ and income y¯ but that the evolution of cultural types
is still going on. Once a migration of individualists from the core has taken place, further
migrations from the core are not possible.
3.2.1 Core-frontier differences
What affects the individualists’ welfare in case of a colonization of a frontier territory?
To begin with, we assume that the colonizers would have to bear a fixed costs η + θ > 0.
η reflects the often substantial hardships of breaking up and migrating to a new region.
θ are costs of adaptation in the frontier region. These might include the need to adjust
the package of plants and animals brought from the core due to new climatic or soil
characteristics. The cost of adaptation should also increase with the level of resistance
from the local hunter-gatherers.
Second, we assume that land productivity Af is typically lower in the frontier. This is a
similar assumption as in Olsson and Hibbs (2005) and the intuition is that the core region
is the most productive region for agriculture, which in turn explains why its population
made the transition from hunting-gathering first.
Third, as mentioned above, we assume that the core region has reached its steady-state
level of total population L¯ but not yet its steady-state proportion of individualists ω¯. In
case of a migration, the population will be in disequilibrium in both core and frontier and
14
population growth will resume.
After colonization, the relative strength of cultural influences would also be different.
The colonists who move to the frontier will set up a new society which they will now
govern themselves. Also in this frontier, the agricultural mode of production will inevitably
require substantial coordinated efforts such as clearing of land, planning and construction
of villages, defensive fortifications, planting, sowing and harvesting. In order to cope with
these necessary tasks, a central authority needs to make decisions for the community as a
whole. Infectious diseases will most likely also take root and the farmers will be attacked
by predatory hunter-gatherers. Due to these forces, there will therefore gradually emerge
new collectivist tendencies from within the new society to conform, in a similar manner
as in the core.
However, since the group of colonists who initially moved to the new territory were all
individualistic types, the cultural influences towards collectivism in the frontier are weaker
than if the group had stayed in the core. Although all populations probably have some
inclinations towards conformism, such predispositions should be a lot less pronounced
among marginalized groups who choose to emigrate rather than submitting to an auto-
cratic leadership. We convey this idea by assuming that the collectivistic cultural influence
in the new land becomes σf = σ (1− δ) where δ < 1.15
By the same logic, if all the individualists leave the core region, the forces towards
collectivism should become even stronger there after their departure. For simplicity, let us
assume that the strength of cultural assimilation after a break-up is σc = σ (1 + δ) so that
the differences in cultural influences between core and frontier are symmetric. µ remains
constant in both locations.
Finally, let us assume that the choice at time t − 1 whether to emigrate or not is
determined by the criterion in (10), showing the expected net welfare gain from a move
to the frontier that is completed at t:
Ωft−1 = v
I,f
t − vIt−1 − η − θ = (10)
= γγ y¯γ−1
(
Af
ωt−1L¯
)1−α (
P I,ft
)1−γ − γγ y¯γ · (P It−1)1−γ − η − θ = (11)
= γγ y¯γ
[(
Af
ωt−1A
)1−α
· ((1− σ (1− δ))1−γ − (ωt−1 (1− σ) + (1− ωt−1)µ)1−γ
]
− η − θ
In this expression, the individualists compare the expected indirect utility after a move
to the frontier vI,ft with the current period’s indirect utility v
I
t−1 and with the costs of
15One might certainly argue that cultural influences towards autocracy are also affected by other factors.
The geographical distance to the conformist core might for instance matter. Ashraf and Galor (2011b)
show that the geographical isolation of a region has a strong impact on the extent to which it is exposed
to non-conformist ideas. Another well-known hypothesis is that agricultural societies based on irrigation
are more prone to develop autocracy than regions depending on river fed agriculture (Bentzen et al, 2013;
Wittfogel, 1957).
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breaking up and migrating (η + θ). The indirect utility terms depend on utility from
income per person and from the proportion of individualistic types in the population.
Utility from income in the frontier in the lower line is y¯γ ·
(
Af
ωt−1A
)1−α
which is greater
than utility from steady-state income in the core y¯γ if Af > ωt−1A. Income per person in
the frontier is often higher than the steady-state level y¯ since a relatively small population
(ωt−1L¯) migrate and have a relatively high marginal productivity right after the move.
The proportion of individualists one period after a move to the frontier is P I,ft =
ωft+1 = 1 − σ (1− δ). This follows from the fact that ωft = 1, i.e. in the first period in
the new land, the whole migrating population will at first be individualistic, whereupon a
fraction σ (1− δ) will turn collectivist already in t+1. If the individualists stay in the core,
their population share at t would instead have been P It−1 = ωt = ωt−1 (1− σ − µ) + µ.
The individualists will only decide to move if Ωft−1 > 0. The representative individuals
in the model are only able to plan for their off-spring one generation ahead and do not
take into account the long-term, steady-state consequences of a move. Furthermore, we
assume that only one wave of out-migration from each region is possible.
The expression in (10) allows us to express the following result:
Proposition 1: The probability of a break-away and colonization by the individualistic
farmers increases with Af/A, δ and τ and decreases with µ, η and θ at any t.
The results follow from straightforward comparative statics on the basis of (10). Al-
though we know that Af/A < 1 is most often the case, a relatively high ratio (indicating
small land productivity differences) will make a colonization more likely. The factor cap-
turing the decrease in collectivist influences in the frontier, δ, is also positively related
to a decision to migrate. Not surprisingly, the individualists will appreciate if their own
cultural type stands a greater chance of maintaining a high proportion in the future.
A high µ in the core makes a colonization by individualists less likely. The intuition
is that a strong individualistic cultural influence from outside the core would balance the
evolution of collectivist and individualistic attitudes and make living in the core more
tolerable for the individualists.
Should the time cost of raising children τ be very high, this will make a colonization less
likely. If, for instance, both core and frontier are in a very harsh climate, τ is probably
high, which in turn will imply that people choose to have relatively few children. Few
children means a relatively low steady-state level of the population and, for a given level
of A, a relatively high steady-state level of income per person. From (10), we see that
this will give a greater weight to the utility comparison on the left-hand side and make a
migration more likely.
The impact of σ is ambiguous since a high level causes both the utility of moving and
of staying to be lower.
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3.2.2 Barriers to migration
Proposition 1 shows that a higher cost of breaking up η and of adaptation θ will make
an emigration a less attractive alternative. It is well known that the settlement of Europe
by farming populations was far from a smooth process. As discussed above, there were at
least two temporal discontinuities in the spread of agriculture northwestwards: The rapid
advance of the LBK-culture into the loess soils of the Rhineland around 5500 BCE and
the final move into the Baltic areas after 4500 BCE. Is our model able to accommodate
such rather dramatic patterns of farmer settlement?
Judging from the archaeological evidence, it appears that two features are particularly
important for understanding the LBK expansion. First, as suggested by Bellwood (2005)
and others, the soil and climate of the Northwestern Europe required an adjusted com-
bination of plants and animals in order to work. Farmers were probably for a long time
unwilling or unable to cope with these very high costs of adjustment θ, which explains
why the further settlement was delayed for hundreds of years.
Second, when new colonization eventually did take place and farmers settled the plains
of northern Germany and France with their modified technology, they were able to exploit
a high land quality Af . As shown above, the high land quality implied that population
growth was initially very rapid, which could explain the spike in number of archaeological
sites in Figure 2.
The later expansion into the coastal areas was most likely delayed for other reasons.
The relative suitability of these areas for agriculture was not always great, implying a
relatively low Af , and farmers met a determined resistance from well-fed hunters and
fishermen, living off the aquatic resources of the area. This resistance also implied a high
adjustment cost θ which had a quite different character from the technological problems
of the LBK farmers. The relatively low Af implied that population growth did not take
off to the same extent as during LBK. This also explains why we do not see a clear peak
for this expansion in Figure 2.
In the empirical section, we will pay special attention to the LBK expansion and
investigate whether it was the case that the process of cultural diffusion fundamentally
changed after this period.
3.2.3 Cultural dynamics
Figure 3 shows a stylized example of the type of long-run cultural dynamics that our
model predicts before and after a colonization. Initially, the distribution of cultural types
ωt and 1 − ωt is relatively even in the core but the fact that σ > µ inevitably leads to
a stronger and stronger domination by the collectivist share of the population. At time
t = −1, we assume that ωt has fallen so low that the indirect utility comparison shows
that the individualists would actually be better off in the frontier in the next generation.
Hence, since the criteria for a migration is fulfilled, they decide to emigrate to the new
territory.
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Insert Figure 2
Immediately after colonization, which happens in a time period that we will refer to
as t = 0, the population in the core will consist of 100 percent collectivists (1 − ωc0 = 1)
since all the individualists have moved to the frontier. Similarly, the share of collectivists
in the frontier will be 1 − ωf0 = 0. The emigrated individualists produce, consume, and
raise children in their new land. The much lower population in both regions means that
wages, birth rates, and utility are initially higher than before.
As new generations grow up, the two regions will be subject to a similar basic process
of cultural dynamics as before. Already at t = 1, the share of individualists in the core
will have increased to be ωf1 = 0 · (1− σ(1 + δ))+1 ·µ = µ > 0. In the example in figure 3,
this amounts to ω1 = 0.1.
16 The share of collectivists in the frontier in period t = 1 will be
1− ωf1 = 0.2. The proportion of cultural types in core and colony will immediately start
to converge towards their long-run steady state levels. In the example, assuming δ = 0.5,
the new steady-state ratio of collectivists to individualists will be 1−ω¯
c
ω¯c =
σ(1+δ)
µ = 6 in
the core, compared to 4 before the break-away. Already by three generations after the
break-away, the core region will almost have converged, as shown in figure 3.
In the new land, the proportion of collectivists will rapidly increase as a new community
with chiefs and public goods is created. In the example in figure 3, the collectivists will
be in majority already after four generations. The long-run steady state level is even
1−ω¯f
ω¯f
= σ(1−δ)µ = 2 in the colony. Thus, the collectivists will be twice as many as the
individualists in the long run. This is certainly a substantially lower ratio than in the core
but much higher than in the first pioneer days of the colony.
3.2.4 Repeated migrations towards periphery
In the highly stylized example above, there is only a core and a frontier. If we instead
imagine multiple regions {f0(= c), f1, f2, ...fp} , located such that fp is the periphery with
the greatest distance to the core, then we can model the further migration of farmers
from the first agricultural colony through a whole sequence of migrations towards the
periphery. Following the same logic as above, when unhappy individualists decide to
leave the first frontier colony f1, the collectivist cultural influence will once again increase
with a fraction δ such that σf1 = σ (1− δ) (1 + δ) = σ
(
1− δ2). In the new colony, we
have σf2 = σ (1− δ)2 to start with and σf2 = σ (1− δ)2 (1 + δ) after another group of
individualists have left f2. When farmers have come all the way to the periphery where
no further migrations are possible, σfp = σ (1− δ)p.
In general, for regions fj where j ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...p− 1} are integers, we will have that
σfj = σ (1− δ)j (1 + δ). Hence, it is obviously the case that σc > σf1 > σf2 > ... > σfp .
The steady-state ratio of collectivists to individualists will thus be
16The example assumes parameter values σ = 0.4, η = 0.1, and δ = 0.5.
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1− ω¯fj
ω¯fj
=
σfj
σfj+µ
µ
σfj+µ
=
σ (1− δ)j (1 + δ)
µ
for all j ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...p− 1}
which falls with j. In other words, the periphery will have the greatest proportion of
individualists of all regions on the continent due to the repeated process of self-selected
migrations by individualists.
3.2.5 Culture and the time of agricultural transition
Although we have not explicitly modelled the time since the first introduction of agriculture
by migrating farmers into a region, it is very easy to grasp that if tc is the time of
introduction of agriculture in the core and tfj is time of colonization of region fj , then
we will have that tc < tf1 < tf2 < ... < tfp . If our contemporary period is T , then time
since agricultural transition for region fj is T − tfj . Since we know that tfj has a negative
association with σfj and thus a positive association with ω¯
fj , is must be the case that ω¯fj
has a negative relationship with T − tfj .
This pattern is the mechanism behind the key hypotheses in the empirical section:
Proposition 2: The steady-state proportion of individualistic cultural norms in a
region is negatively related to the time since its settlement by Neolithic farmers.
This proposition summarizes the main insight of the model. To repeat, we have mod-
elled a world where agriculture originates in a core region that is dominated by collectivists.
Since the individualists in the core are a shrinking minority, they will eventually find that
migrating to the frontier is a better option for the adult generation than remaining at
home.17 This process then repeats itself as the share of collectivists increases in every
frontier region soon after colonization. Agriculture emerges last in the periphery but
individualistic norms will be the strongest here due to the repeated self-selection of indi-
vidualistic migrants. Hence, there is a negative relationship between time since transition
to agriculture and the prominence of individualistic norms.
In the empirical sections below, we test the prediction that collectivist cultural norms
favoring obedience and autocracy over individualism and democracy, should be stronger
in regions that made an early transition to agriculture than in regions that made a later
transition.
4 Data
The key empirical relationship that we investigate in the sections below is the impact
of the time since transition to agriculture on current and historical cultural norms and
institutions. In order to measure the timing of the transition to agriculture, we employ the
17Even during historical episodes when individuals have not self-selected into emigrating, it has very
often been marginalized groups who have been forced out of a home country, such as Jewish populations
in Medieval Europe or the sentencing of British prisoners to labor in Australia.
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same data as in Olsson and Paik (2013). In short, Olsson and Paik (2013) use information
from 765 Neolithic sites with calibrated C14-dates of transition throughout Europe and
Southwest Asia from Pinhasi et al (2005) to create an approximate date of transition to
agriculture for 492 small regions and 64 countries.18
The broad area that we study is the Western agricultural core area, encompassing Eu-
rope, Southwest Asia, and North Africa. The choice of aggregating these regions follows
Morris (2010) and is based on the notion that all these regions experienced a spread of
Neolithic agriculture based on domesticated plants and animals from the Fertile Crescent
in the Middle East. In the regional sample, we follow Eurostat’s definition of European
regions on the basis of administrative criteria. Appendix 1 gives information on the di-
visions of subnational regions: there are 492 regions from 43 countries included in the
analysis on norms and 64 Western countries when democracy is the dependent variable.
Categories of regions mainly follow Eurostat’s definition of European regions on the basis
of administrative criteria. At the most aggregated level, NUTS1 level classifies regions
with population ranging from 3 to 7 millions; NUTS 2 level divides regions based on pop-
ulation ranging from 800,000 to 3 millions, and NUTS 3 refers to the most disaggregated
level- 800,000 and below. For the countries not covered by Eurostat (Iran, Iraq, Jordan,
Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia), the intrastate administrative divisions are based on
ESRI Data and Maps Series 2006.
The key explanatory variable is Average time since agricultural transition. The mean
date of transition (in k years) in the cross-country sample of 43 countries is 7.465 (i.e. 5465
BCE) and 7.28 (5280 BCE) in the regional sample. Out of these regions, 76 percent of
them witnessed adoption after 5500 BCE, confirming a rapid dispersion of migrant farmers
after LBK expansion.19 The earliest transition date in the two samples is from the region
Umara in current Iraq where a transition was made already in 8862 BCE.
We use two dependent variables capturing collectivist cultural norms; obedience and
control, both obtained from the World Value Survey’s four-wave integrated data file be-
tween 1981-2004 (WVS, 2006). Both variables have previously featured as key cultural
variables in for instance (Tabellini, 2010). We use intrastate regional data at the most
disaggregated levels available as the basic unit of analysis, and compare our findings to the
aggregate country-level results. While the survey does not specify the hometown of each
respondent, it does indicate where the survey took place (Question 048). This information
is then used to identify which particular region the respondent lives in. By geographically
matching cultural differences among the intrastate regions with the regions’ dates of tran-
sition to agriculture, we analyze the impact of the Neolithic revolution on the current
cultural divergence.
More specifically, WVS provides a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to
learn at home, and asks the respondent to choose up to five qualities that are especially
18See Olsson and Paik (2013) for more detailed information concerning the underlying GIS methodology
for mapping the dates from Pinhasi et al (2005) onto geographical units.
19Figure 1 shows the distribution of this variable in detail.
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important. The level of obedience is measured by aggregating at the regional or country
level individual responses which included obedience as an important quality (question
A042). It is defined as the percentage of respondents in each geographical unit that has
mentioned obedience as being important.
Similarly, control measures the degree that the individual experiences a freedom of
choice and a sense of control of one’s life. The information comes from question A173 in
the survey: ”Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives,
while other people feel that what we do has no real effect on what happens to them. Please
use this scale (from 1 to 10) where 1 means ”none at all” and 10 means ”a great deal” to
indicate how much freedom of choice and control in life you have over the way your life
turns out.” Tabellini (2010) interprets a high score on this variable as reflecting a belief
that individual effort is likely to pay off. Figures 3 and 4 present regional scatter plots of
the obedience and control measures against the agricultural adoption date, respectively,
in a sample of almost 500 regions. The value for obedience is positively correlated, while
the feeling of control is negatively correlated with the time since agriculture. What also
appears very clearly in the graphs is a cluster of observations from the LBK expansion
that started to emerge about 7500 years ago.
Insert Fig 3
Insert Fig 4
Apart from the obvious advantage of using variables that have been often used in
other studies, how do we motivate our use of these two particular indicators as proxies for
conformist cultural norms? Starting with obedience, we interpret this norm to be strongly
salient in both primitive and modern hierarchical, collectivist societies, indicating the
level of acceptance in a hierarchical system. It is also closely related to the Individualism-
Collectivism (I-C) cultural construct, which has been the focus of many studies in a
wide range of disciplines (Triandis, 1987; Kitayama et al, 2007). Individualism has been
defined as ”the subordination of the goals of the collectivists to individual goals, whereas
collectivism involves the opposite, that is, the subordination of the individual to the goals
of a collective (Hui and Triandis, 1986). Individualists perceive themselves as independent
of collectives; give priority to their own preferences, needs, and rights; are motivated to
achieve personal goals rather than the goals of others (Hui and Triandis, 1986); are driven
by their own beliefs, values and attitudes (Leung and Bond, 1984); and focus on rational
analyses of the advantages and disadvantages of establishing contacts with others. On the
other hand, collectivist societies consist of closely linked individuals who see themselves as
parts of one or more collectives, and hence, are more likely to be driven by social norms,
obligations and duties imposed by those collectives.20
20As an example that classifies farmers as collectivists, Keeley (1988) conducts a study of 94 existing
primitive groups, and finds positive correlations among class division, storage of resources and level of
sedantism. Triandis (1987) finds that individualist societies tend to be hunting, gathering, fishing, or
foraging societies. The members of these societies do much trading and prod children to become adults,
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The measures for obedience and control are exceptions to other cultural measures
discussed in numerous studies, in the sense that the others are not more easily categorized
along the I-C cultural construct. For example, the very often used indicator for generalized
trust is a variable that is not easily identified along the I-C construct.21 It is created from
responses to the following question (A165): ”Generally speaking, would you say that
most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” The
question does not clarify how each respondent defines ”most people” in the survey. People
can be inclusive of aliens outside the respondent’s country, or only the ones within the
respondent’s home region. If it pertains only to close acquaintances, the response would
be very different as well. Similarly, most of the qualities in children mentioned above
are universally accepted as important to society regardless of its cultural construct: hard
work, perseverance, unselfishness and thriftiness are qualities that would have been valued
in both prehistoric and modern societies.
There are of course geographic factors and historical events that may also have influ-
ence on the current variations of beliefs in obedience and sense of control. These include
the mean elevation, access to water and area coverage, as well as empires that encom-
passed many of the regions, intensification of agriculture and the Industrial Revolution.
To see why empires matter, note that the roots of European growth is commonly seen
in the Roman Empire (Jones, 1981), while the presence of Ottoman rule may have erad-
icated some nations’ Roman traditions (Acemoglu et al., 2005). This paper includes the
approximate number of centuries that each of the Roman, Byzantine and Ottoman em-
pires influenced a region, based on the boundary changes every century from 0 to 2000
AD in Euratlas vectorial maps (http://www.euratlas.com/index.html). Furthermore,
the agricultural environment likely had an impact on both early and modern institutions.
Our empirical analysis includes the fraction of each land unit cultivated into croplands or
pastures in 1600 CE from Pongratz et al. (2008)22 Third, the paper uses the total regional
railroad length as a measure of the extent to which each region became industrialized.
The railroad was the ”perfect symbol of the aspect of continuous, self-sustaining economic
growth” of the Revolution (Spielvogel, 1991); as state societies became predominantly ur-
ban and state power was based on possession of coal and iron and their production rather
while collectivist societies, tend to be agricultural, only trade minimally, and allow children to become
adults when they are ready. Barry et al. (1959) find similar results; in their study, groups categorized
as fishing and hunting societies with little accumulation of food resources (as opposed to pastoral/animal
husbandry) encourage childraising qualities of achievement and independence, rather than obedience and
responsibility. Furthermore, the size of permanent settlement, degree of political integration and social
stratification are all positively correlated with pressure towards compliance and the level of resource accu-
mulation. These studies all show that under the I-C cultural construct, there is a close connection between
today’s primitive group characteristics and archaeological findings, suggesting that there may be persistent
cultural inheritance over generations that are evident in modern societies as well.
21See for instance Knack and Keefer (1997) for studies of the macro relationship between trust and
economic growth.
22The year 1600 represents the final period in history when agriculture was the main determinant
of living standards and state power. By 1700 overseas trading especially by the Atlantic traders took
over, leading the nations to urbanization, increased militarization and pushed them toward the Industrial
Revolution (Acemoglu et al., 2005).
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than agriculture, the demand for faster means of transportation to fuel the growth of the
industrial economy led to more production of iron and coal, which in turn reinforced the
need for expansion of railroads.23 Finally, the cultural norms are to a large extent deter-
mined by current demography divided according to age, sex and education levels. Age,
sex and education levels are directly obtained from WVS. In order to account for these
other channels through which cultural divergence may have risen, this paper compares the
effect of settlement timing with and without a set of these controls. The main results, as
will be shown below, remain robust to these controls.
5 Empirical Strategy
As discussed above, our empirical analysis investigates the relationship between our de-
pendent variables cultural norms/institutions and our main independent variable Average
time since the transition to agriculture on two levels of aggregation: Western countries
and Western regions. First in the cross-country analysis, our straightforward specification
is
Zi = α1 + α2Ti + α3Xi + i (12)
where Zi is our measure of cultural norms (obedience or control) or democratic institutions
in country i, Ti is the Average time since the transition to agriculture, Xi is a set of
geographic and historical control variables discussed in detail above, and i is a normally
distributed error term. Our main hypothesis is that α2 > 0 when Zi is obedience and
α2 < 0 when Zi is control or a proxy for democracy.
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The contemporary outcomes recorded in Zi typically appeared at least five millennia
after Ti was realized. Nonetheless, it could potentially be the case that Neolithic norms
or institutions had an impact on Ti and then persisted to influence Zi. This conjecture
is impossible to rule out, especially when the Neolithic transition is considered to be
the greatest social and technological revolution experienced by man before the Industrial
revolution. The transition to agriculture was mainly introduced to a region by migrating
outsiders. Hence, we believe it is more convincing to argue that outside the region of
origin, agriculture appeared as an exogenous intervention that had little to do with hunter-
gatherer institutions at the time. Furthermore, when the Neolithic migrants moved out
of the origin of agriculture, they settled in the arable lands with access to water close
to the origin, and the timing of agricultural adoption reflects the length of the journey
that migrants needed to take away from their homelands. In order to control for any
23The railroad data comes from two sources; for Europe, the ESRI 2008 Street Map and Data contains
the railroad information in ArcGIS format. For the Middle East, the railroad data was obtained from
MAPSearch’s 2007 Middle East Pipeline/Facilities Spatial and Relational Data.
24A number of studies have hypothesized that there is either a causal link from culture to institutions
or from formal institutions to culture (Alesina and Giuliano, 2014). In this study, our main argument is
that both culture and institutions are driven by the deeper historical processes inherent in the Neolithic
transition to agriculture.
23
independent effect that geographic endowment might have had on the current cultural
outcomes, we include a group of geographic variables including the area scale, access to
water and the mean elevation.
In addition to the list of geographic variables, there is a spike in the spread of agri-
culture in 5500 BCE, as shown in Figure 1. While we cannot accurately control for this
distribution pattern at the country level, given the scale of each unit, we are able to ac-
count for these events at the regional level. In the regional sample, our specification will
therefore be
Zij = β1 + β2Tij + β3Xij + β4Fi + ij . (13)
where Zij now measures cultural norms in region j in country i. The main difference
from (12) is the inclusion of an indicator in the vector of controls Xi, for whether the
transition took place after 5500 BCE, and an interaction term between the indicator and
the adoption date variable. We also include the country fixed effect Fi so that we can
focus on within-country variations.
A potential issue that concerns any works investigating the long term impact of histor-
ical events is that the regions in consideration likely were subject to subsequent migrations
after the Neolithic Revolution. In this regard, the regions of Europe and the Middle East
provide a better ground for empirical testing than others. The Neolithic Revolution in
Eurasia was mainly a unidirectional spread of agriculture, with little evidence of people
migrating back and forth. Relative to other parts of the world, these regions now consist
of almost entirely indigenous populations. Since population admixtures became the norm
after the great diaspora started in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, especially in the
Americas, it is imperative to take further precautions and look at a continent where such
admixture is minimized (Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2013). Putterman and Weil (2010) finds
that Europe is a continent of countries with almost entirely indigenous populations in
contrast to some countries of the New World (Australia, New Zealand and Canada) that
are predominantly of European origin, and some others (Central American and Andean
countries) that have both large Amerindian and substantial European-descended popula-
tions.
6 Findings
Tables 1-3 present the results from our regression analysis.25 Given that the norms against
obedience and emphasis on control in one’s life are pronounced in democratic institutions,
are countries in fact more likely to be democratic if they adopted agriculture later? Table
1 presents a number of indicators for democracy, both historical (Executive constraint in
1500 AD from Acemoglu et al., 2005) and current (Democracy stock from 1900 to 2000,
25The estimates for geographical, historical, and demographic control variables are not shown in the
tables but are available upon request.
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depreciated 1 percent from Gerring et al., 2005), and Polity 2 measured in 2010 against the
agricultural adoption date. It also presents the individualism range, one of six dimensions
of culture as presented in Hofstede et al (2010).26 Regardless of which variable we use, the
relationship between our indicators for democracy and individualism, and time since the
Neolithic revolution, remains negative and robust. The coefficient values suggest that it
was unlikely for countries which adopted agriculture early to have experienced democracy
or become individualistic during the last century.
Insert Table 1
Our main dependent variables are however obedience and control, reflecting cultural
norms conducive to individualism as opposed to collectivism. Table 2 presents the em-
pirical results at the country level. The coefficient value of the average adoption date is
statistically significant as controls are included in Columns 1 to 3. The Geography controls
include the mean elevation, coast to area ratio and area; Historical controls include the
fraction of arable land in 1600, the number of centuries of Roman, Byzantine and Ottoman
Empire rule, and length of railways; and finally Demography controls include average age,
sex ratio and education levels of WVS respondences.
Insert Table 2
In Column 3, the coefficient value of 9.5 suggests that a country adopting agriculture
early by 1000 years is likely to witness an increase of 9.5 in the percentage of respondents
valuing obedience. In other words, one standard deviation of agricultural transition ex-
plains about 70 percent of the standard deviation in the obedience measure.27 Similarly,
Columns 4 to 6 present results in which the dependent variable is the control measure.
With the exception of Column 5, in which the t-stat for the agricultural adoption mea-
sure is -1.52, there is a strong negative correlation between the level of confidence in the
respondent’s sense of being in control of his/her life and how early the country adopted
agriculture. In Column 6, a delay in agricultural transition by 1000 years explains an
increase in the percentage by 9 points.
Table 3 presents the regional analysis with the same set of controls. The main difference
here is that unlike the country-level analysis, in which the agricultural adoption date is
averaged across the entire country, we are now able to make a more accurate use of the
transition dates based on Pinhasi et al (2005)’s detailed data. Apart from the continuous
measure of the agricultural adoption date, we now introduce a binary variable based on
whether the region experienced its agricultural transition later than 5500 BCE, i.e. after
the LBK expansion. The analysis also includes the interaction term between the adoption
26The range is from 0 to 100, with 100 reflecting the most individualistic country. In our sample the
United Kingdom has the highest score of 89, and Pakistan has the lowest score of 14. The other dimensions
measured by the authors include power distance, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, long term orientation
and indulgence.
27The mean obedience measure is 31 with standard deviation of 14.7, and the mean agricultural adoption
date variable is 7.467 with the standard deviation of 1.1
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date and the indicator for this time period. Figures 3-4 show the unconditional scatter
plots of the relationship between our cultural variables and the agricultural adoption date.
In addition to these controls for the LBK expansion, the regression results always include
a country-fixed effect.
Insert Table 3
For both the obedience and control measures, the findings are similar to the ones
presented in Table 2; the timing of agricultural transition has a positive impact on the
obedience measure and a negative impact on the control measure. The regions on average
find that an earlier agricultural adoption by 1000 years is associated with an increase
of the percent of respondents valuing obedience by 4.6 to 6.35 points, depending on the
regression specification. The effect is similar in magnitude for the decrease in the percent of
respondents believing that they have control in their lives. The results are consistent with
our main hypothesis proposing that a later transition to agriculture should be associated
with stronger norms towards democracy and individualism.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have outlined an agricultural origins-theory of cultural divergence, argu-
ing that differences in norms along the collectivism-individualism dimension can ultimately
be traced back to the Neolithic revolution. Due to the nature of early agricultural pro-
duction, the high risk of predation from neighbouring peoples, and the high prevalence
of infectious disease in the early farming villages, the population in the agricultural core
region of Western Eurasia very early developed strong collectivistic cultural norms. Given
the threat of extinction in the core, people with individualistic cultural norms chose to
migrate and set up farming villages in frontier territories. When collectivistic norms again
strengthened also in the new territories, new groups of individualistic migrants pushed the
frontier towards the northwest of Europe. In this way, the most individualistic farmers
self-selected into eventually occupying the northwestern periphery in Europe in current
Great Britain and Scandinavia. This bias in cultural norms towards more individualism
in regions that adopted agriculture relatively late, is predicted to have persisted to the
present day.
When we confront this hypothesis with data from the World Value Survey on individu-
als’ perceptions of whether children should be obedient and if they have a sense of control
of their lives, we find that the strength of individualistic norms is negatively related to
the time since the transition to Neolithic agriculture. Likewise, we find that institutions
associated with individualism such as the level of democracy are also negatively related
to the time since the agricultural transition. In regions where agriculture was adopted
early, people do not think they have a strong control of their lives and value obedience
and autocracy rather than independence and democracy.
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The model in the paper was primarily designed to explain the gradual expansion of
farmers throughout the Western area but might potentially also be used to explain other
historical migrations such as the Austronesian expansion in Southeast Asia and in the Pa-
cific and the massive migration of poor Europeans to America during the last two hundred
years. Casual observation seems to suggest that it was mainly people with individualistic
norms who settled on the other side of the Atlantic. Future research might also shed light
on whether the timing of the transition to agriculture is also relevant for understanding
related facets of individualism such as the adoption of Protestantism and a preference for
social equality.
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Table 2: Relationship between cultural dependent variables Obedience and Control and
independent variable Average time since agricultural transition among 43 Western coun-
tries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DV:Obedience DV:Control
Av. time since 7.998∗∗ 10.317∗∗∗ 9.508∗∗ -7.763∗∗ -4.187 -8.992∗
agriculture in 2000 (3.157) (3.518) (4.623) (3.769) (2.750) (4.801)
Geography Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Historical No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Demography No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 43 42 41 43 42 41
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01.
The main independent variable is Average time since agricultural transition in 2000.
Geography controls include mean elevation, land area and ratio of Atlantic Coast
to area from Acemoglu et al (2005). Historical controls include agricultural suitability
in 1600 AD and total railroad length, centuries of rule under Roman, Ottoman
and Byzantine empires. Demography controls include the average age, percentage of
males and years in school among the WVS respondents.
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Table 3: Relationship between Obedience and Control, and Average time since agricultural
transition among 492 Western regions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DV:Obedience DV:Control
Agric. time since 4.790∗∗ 6.350∗∗∗ 4.610∗∗ -4.939∗∗ -6.826∗∗∗ -4.747∗∗
agriculture in 2000 (2.231) (2.319) (2.020) (2.331) (2.395) (2.392)
Geography Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
LBK Interaction Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Historical No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Demography No No Yes No No Yes
Country F/E Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 472 466 400 486 481 415
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01.
The main independent variable is Average time since agricultural transition in 2000.
Geography controls include mean elevation, land area and ratio of Atlantic Coast
to area from Acemoglu et al (2005). Historical controls include agricultural suitability
in 1600 AD and total railroad length, centuries of rule under Roman, Ottoman
and Byzantine empires. Demography controls include the average age, percentage of
males and years in school among the WVS respondents. All specifications further
include country fixed effects, an LBK dummy (=1) if the transition to agriculture
happened after 7500 BC, and an interaction term between the LBK dummy and Average
time since agricultural transition in 2000.
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Figures
Figure 1: Distribution of average time since agricultural transition over Western 492
regions
35
Figure 2: Example of individualist and collectivist population share dynamics before and
after a colonizing event
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Figure 3: Unconditional linear relationship between Obedience and Average time since
agricultural transition in Western regions
Note: the line slope coefficient estimate is from Table 3 Column 1.
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Figure 4: Unconditional linear relationship between Control and Average time since agri-
cultural transition in Western regions
Note: the line slope coefficient estimate is from Table 3 Column 4.
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Appendix
Table 4: Regional Classification
Regions NUTS3 NUTS2 NUTS1 Others
Included
Albania 4 4 0 0 0
Armenia 1 1 0 0 0
Austria 9 0 9 0 0
Azerbaijan 1 1 0 0 0
Belarus 6 6 0 0 0
Belgium 10 0 10 0 0
Bosnia And Herzegovina 2 0 2 0 0
Bulgaria 26 26 0 0 0
Croatia 20 20 0 0 0
Czech Republic 10 10 0 0 0
Denmark 14 14 0 0 0
Egypt 6 0 0 0 6
France 8 0 0 8 0
Georgia 1 1 0 0 0
Germany 27 0 14 13 0
Great Britain 12 0 0 12 0
Greece 20 20 0 0 0
Hungary 20 20 0 0 0
Iran 13 0 0 0 13
Iraq 16 0 0 0 16
Ireland 8 8 0 0 0
Israel 6 0 0 0 6
Italy 20 0 20 0 0
Jordan 7 0 0 0 7
Latvia 5 5 0 0 0
Lithuania 8 8 0 0 0
Luxembourg 1 1 0 0 0
Macedonia 1 1 0 0 0
Netherlands 12 0 12 0 0
Poland 34 34 0 0 0
Portugal 5 0 5 0 0
Republic Of Moldova 1 1 0 0 0
Romania 40 40 0 0 0
Russian Federation 2 0 0 0 2
Saudi Arabia 8 0 0 0 8
Serbia And Montenegro 3 3 0 0 0
Slovakia 8 8 0 0 0
Slovenia 12 12 0 0 0
Spain 16 0 16 0 0
Sweden 13 13 0 0 0
Switzerland 19 19 0 0 0
Turkey 13 0 13 0 0
Ukraine 24 24 0 0 0
Total Number of countries: 43
Total Number of Regions: 492
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